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The objective of the study was to provide empirical evidence on whether food aid leads 
to depressed domestic maize prices and reduced maize production in subsequent years in 
Swaziland.  Similar impact studies have been carried out in a number of sub-Saharan 
African countries but no evidence is available for Swaziland.  The lack of empirical 
evidence has often resulted in premature negative conclusions on the impact of food aid 
on Swaziland’s maize industry.   
 
The study used secondary national data from 1985 to 2006 to analyse the impact of food 
aid on maize producer prices and quantity of maize produced.  Variables used in the 
analysis included quantity of cereal food aid; quantity of commercial maize imports; 
quantity of locally produced maize; official maize producer price; open market maize 
producer price; fertilizer price; fuel price; rainfall; and total area planted to maize.  The 
impact of food aid was measured using the reduced form market equilibrium model that 
consisted of maize quantity and maize producer price functions estimated simultaneously 
using the above variables through the two-stage least square method (2SLS) method.   
 
Analytical results revealed that food aid to Swaziland does not lower prices of domestic 
maize and has no significant negative effect on the quantity of maize produced in 
subsequent seasons.  This means that food aid received by Swaziland over the study years 
has been appropriately targeted and distributed to the food insecure households.  If this 
were not so, the demand for food from commercial out ets would have been reduced, 
leading to an adverse impact on maize producer prices, and subsequent local maize 
production.     
 
Notwithstanding the above results, Swaziland should still commit resources towards 
reducing the national food gap.  This calls for increased investment in rural irrigation 
development, improved farmer institutional support services, and the implementation of 
pro-poor development programs aimed at improving indiv dual household income to 
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  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
1.1 Introduction and background 
 
While food aid has served a valuable function in saving lives in times of disaster, when 
normal food supply channels are disrupted, it has in many cases, had undesirable 
consequences by impacting on local markets in developing economies where it has 
continued to be distributed beyond transitory shortfalls in domestic food availability 
(Ingco et al, 2003; Barrett, 2002).  Issues concerned with the resultant effects of food aid 
have been debated and analysed since the early 1960's by numerous researchers without 
definite conclusions on how food aid affects agricultural production (Tapio-Bistrom, 
2001; Gilligan et al, 2005). 
 
Although food aid is declining globally, it continues to constitute an important part of 
overall donor assistance to southern Africa.  There has been a significant shift, both 
globally and regionally, away from programme food ai , with nearly two thirds of all 
food aid now being used for emergency assistance (Maunder et al, 2006).  While 
relatively little food aid was provided to southern Africa in the early and late 1990’s, a 
substantial food aid response was made in the 2001 – 2003 emergency that was caused by 
drought.  Food aid flows have led to protests about disincentive effects by producers, 
traders and other stakeholders in the agricultural sector (SADC, 2005).    
 
During the 2002-2005 production seasons, cereal food aid played a major role in filling 
Swaziland’s maize gap following Government’s appeal to the international community to 
assist with the impact of  the 2001/02 and successiv  droughts coupled with erratic rains.  
The availability of emergency food aid in Swaziland saw the National Maize Corporation 
(NMC) being unable to buy maize from local farmers in 2002 - 2004 since the 
Corporation’s silos remained full with maize from previous seasons.  The NMC 
experienced difficulties in selling maize to millers who also could not sell maize meal to 
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retailers as people were no longer buying maize meal as they were recieving food aid, 
including maize from donor agencies.  
1.2 Research justification 
 
Considering the extent of alleged negative effects of food aid on domestic agricultural 
production, this study explores empirical evidence to identify the benefits and 
disadvantages of food aid with regards to the Swaziland maize industry.  Similar studies 
have been carried out for sub-Saharan Africa by the Int rnational Food and Policy 
Research Institute  (Abdulai et al, 2004), World Bank (Lavy, 1990), Regional Hunger and 
Vulnerability Programme  (Maunder, 2006) and Lowder (2004), but no evidence is 
available specifically for Swaziland.  The lack of evidence often results in premature 
negative conclusions on the impact of food aid on the country’s maize industry.  
Stakeholders in Swaziland’s maize industry have been involved in lengthy discussions on 
the food aid subject and have agreed on the necessity to avail empirical evidence that will 
confirm the distortions allegedly caused by food ai.  The outcome of the study will 
contribute towards the development of short and long-term policies aimed at fostering 
sustainable food security in the country.   
1.3 Problem statement 
 
Do large quantities of imported food aid raise aggre ate maize supplies on Swaziland 
domestic markets leading to depressed domestic maize prices and reduced maize 
production quantities? 
1.4 Sub problems 
 
1.4.1 Does food aid lead to lower prices in the Swaziland domestic maize market? 
1.4.2 Does food aid act as a disincentive to local maize producers such that the level of 
production in Swaziland is reduced in subsequent seasons? 
1.5 Hypothesis 
 
Food aid causes a reduction in local maize producer price and leads to reduced quantities 
of local maize produced. 
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1.6 Study limits  
 
The study concentrates only on national level effects of food aid.  While there may be 
other impacts at household level, these are beyond the scope of this study.  Another 
limitation is the unavailability of data for some variables in the econometric model 
employed for analyzing the impact of food aid on maize production, necessitating the use 
of dummy variables, proxy variables and average costs t  account for weather, transport 
costs and fertilizer costs, respectively.  The unavail bility of data from a number of local 
institutions has also forced the study to use data between 1985 and 2006 and this has 
affected the degrees of freedom.  However, studies that have used similar methodologies 
were able to produce satisfactory results using data se s for 25 years (Tapio-Bistrom, 
2001), 17 years (Lavy, 1990) and 11 years (Demeke et al, 2004), respectively.  Another 
limitation is the use of annual data, which concentrates on medium term impacts between 
cropping seasons rather than intra-seasonal or short term impacts. 
1.7 Outline of the dissertation 
 
The dissertation contains six chapters.  Chapter one has presented the introduction, 
motivation for the study, problem statement, sub-problems and study limits.  Chapter two 
introduces the Swaziland maize industry, presenting in particular the importance of maize 
as a commodity to the Swazi people.  Chapter three begins by reviewing literature of 
related food aid studies and the impact of food aid on maize production.  Chapter three 
also reviews literature on the effect of food aid on agriculture and looks at quantitative 
methodologies that have been used to study the impact of food aid on local agricultural 
production.   Chapter four outlines the research methodology used,  and  chapter five 
presents analytical results.  Chapter six presents the study conclusions and 
recommendations that may be adopted to ensure that food aid contributes positively 
towards the attainment of national food security.  
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CHAPTER 2 





This chapter introduces the Swaziland maize industry, p esenting in particular, the 
importance of maize as a commodity to the Swazi people.  The chapter is divided into 
four sub sections looking at maize production, marketing and consumption and the 
coordination of food aid in the country. 
 
2.2 Maize production 
 
Maize is the staple food of Swaziland and it is the main crop grown by the vast majority 
of smallholder farmers, largely for subsistence purposes.  Maize is the most predominant 
crop grown on Swazi Nation Land (SNL), covering 80% of the total area under crop 
production (FANRPAN, 2003).  Most maize in Swaziland is produced in the Middleveld, 
which produces 45%; followed by the Highveld, with 28% production, the Lowveld with 
23% and the Lubombo Plateau with 4% (Government of Swaziland, 2004).  Most 
production of maize takes place on SNL, where the average land holdings are 1.7 ha per 
farmer (United Nations Development Programme, 2005).  Despite the favourable agro-
ecological conditions for maize production over much of the country, maize production 
in recent years has declined as, illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Food self sufficiency in terms of maize production has been below 60% since the year 






































































1984/85 85,000     82,553 24000 607 260.00 211.10 
1985/86 85,000     80,561 21484 3049 318.57 308.57 
1986/87 91,000     63,582 6974 7893 351.71 322.43 
1987/88 89,000 143,845 62 80,340 27457 10028 401.00 336.86 
1988/89 123,196 141,058 87 84,371 32060 2541 457.14 352.14 
1989/90 84,371 104,064 81 97,433 16020 4841 521.14 367.86 
1990/91 94,173 101,539 93 83,982 10770 2708 585.71 385.71 
1991/92 53,927 122,920 44 57,330 9917 14975 592.86 428.40 
1992/93 84,519 123,671 68 63,563 37072 24599 928.57 500.00 
1993/94 76,195 94,215 81 61,585 5745 9766 928.57 715.14 
1994/95 76,052 113,357 67 59,726 10352 6150 785.72 610.00 
1995/96 135,627 159,390 85 67,447 23562 9500 785.72 610.00 
1996/97 108,207 133,114 81 60,905 6767 0 714.29 607.14 
1997/98 125,204 131,900 95 65,149 10106 5000 714.29 607.14 
1998/99 107,340 125,500 86 61,051 30760 5000 1,214.29 624.86 
1999/00 112,779 139,000 81 76,210 24812 0 1,142.86 650.00 
2000/01 82,536 155,700 53 64,116 34911 0 1,071.43 700.00 
2001/02 67,639 156,700 43 60,133 41307 15531 1,714.29 750.00 
2002/03 69,273 133,500 52 67,682 24324 24200 2,000.00 750.00 
2003/04 66,862 118,000 57 54,470 18641 12900 2,428.57 750.00 
2004/05 74,540 118,500 63 56,265 18378 12100 2,428.57 950.00 
2005/06 69,210 121,000 57  56,265 21000 9710 2,428.57 950.00 
 6 
The typical seasonal activities for rain-fed maize production in Swaziland begin with land 
preparation during August and September, followed by planting up to the end of 
November.  Weeding is required from December to March to ensure good growth of the 
young crop.  Farmers also use this time to prepare on-farm storage facilities for the maize 
harvest.  After calculating home consumption requirements, any remaining surplus maize is 
marketed.  Harvest times vary by region, with the earli st maize being harvested in the 
Lowveld during March to April.  With good drying conditions, maize can be marketed 
from the end of March.  The bulk of maize is harvested during May to July, and marketed 
from July through to November. 
2.2.1 Maize production by land tenure system  
 
Of the total population of approximately 1 million, 80% of the people of Swaziland live in 
rural areas and practice agriculture (GoS, 2005a).  Agricultural production is divided 
between two distinct categories of land tenure.  SNL accounts for almost 80% of the 
country’s total agricultural land area and approximately 70% of the population reside on 
SNL holdings (FANRPAN, 2003).  This is land held in trust by the King on behalf of the 
nation, and allocated to households through Chiefs.  
 
Production on SNL is characterised by low-input, rainfed agriculture.  Subsistence food 
production dominates with maize being the major crop, accounting 90% of domestic maize 
production (FANRPAN, 2003).  Most SNL households supplement their income with off-
farm wages. 
 
Commercialisation of agriculture on SNL is hindered by the land tenure system which does 
not confer legal ownership of land to farmers.  Not only does this cause uncertainty over 
security of tenure, but also prevents farmers from using land as collateral to borrow capital.  
The other form of land tenure is Title Deed Land (TDL), which is land that is owned on a 
freehold basis.  Title Deed Land farms are oriented towards commercial production and are 
characterised by large-scale, capital intensive entrprises, consisting mainly of sugarcane, 
cotton, citrus and pineapple.  According to Central Statistics Office (2005), maize 
production on TDL accounts for only 5-10% of total maize production.  
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2.3 Maize storage and marketing 
 
After maize has been harvested, households store their food requirements for own 
consumption.  Any surplus is sold to the National Mize Corporation (NMC) or through the 
informal sector.  Since the current maize policy framework sets a constant buying price 
throughout the year, there is no incentive for producers to store maize until the pre-harvest 
period.  This creates a large influx of maize into NMC silos during a short period from May 
to August, with few supplies of maize during other months. 
 
Approximately 80% of rural households have on-farm storage facilities.  The favoured 
method of storage is in corrugated metal tanks (80%), maize cribs (15%), concrete tanks 
(3%), and under ground (2%) (Oxford, 1998).  The NMC operates five silos with the 
largest silo located at Matsapha, providing a central storage facility near the main milling 
company.  The four other silos are located around the country and bulk small quantities of 
maize from local farmers ready for delivery to Matsapha.  No grading system is applied on 
maize delivered other than a check for moisture content and a visual inspection to check for 
non-maize contents and broken grain. 
2.3.1 The National Maize Corporation  
 
The National Maize Corporation (NMC) is a state owned enterprise.  The corporation was 
established in 1985 in accordance with the Companies Act of 1912 and, unlike most 
parastatals, there is no special Act of Parliament tha incorporates it.  Its two major 
shareholders are the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard).  The corporation is presently involved in the 
business of commodity trading in white maize.  It receives no annual subvention from 
Government and generates enough income to cover its running costs (NMC, 2005). 
 
The NMC was established with the objective of guaranteeing a market to local maize 
farmers at competitive prices and providing good quality maize meal at reasonable prices.  
These objectives, however, were changed in 1995 when NMC aborted maize milling, and 
concentrated only on maize purchase, storage and marketing. 
 8 
The corporation has now been, i ter alia, entrusted with the following key responsibilities 
(NMC, 2002): 
 
 To guarantee an all year round competitive market for Swazi maize farmers. 
 To reduce marketing barriers and costs to Swazi farmers by improving maize 
marketing and logistics services (through running national silos efficiently, 
registration of producers, provision of drying and shelling services, and provision of 
price information). 
 To guarantee all year round supplies of maize at reasonable costs to the nation. 
 To increase the efficiency of the maize industry in Swaziland by promoting the 
availability of white maize to consumers at reasonable costs in all regions of the 
country. 
2.3.2 Maize prices  
 
There are predominantly two prices of maize in the Swaziland maize industry.  As shown 
in Figure 1, the official maize market price that is set by NMC, has over the years remained 
lower than prices in the informal sector.  Apart from being reported by the National Early 
Warning Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, data on open market maize 
prices are not formally documented.  However, indications show that the open market 
































































Figure 1: Official market and open market maize prices, 1984/85 – 2005/06 (NMC, 
2006; National Early Warning Unit annual bulletins). 
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The drought spell currently experienced in southern Africa has impacted on maize prices.  
Since 2000, maize prices have increased due to a shrtage of white maize in the region as a 
result of the drought and a decrease in the total area planted to maize (FANRPAN, 2003).  
The NMC also imports relatively expensive maize, and being the sole importer of maize in 
the country, the importing price has influenced the local price of maize (FANRPAN, 2003).  
2.3.3 Maize policy and market interventions  
 
Since independence (1968), Swaziland Government’s itervention in the maize sector has 
been aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in production of the country’s staple food 
(Oxford, 1998).  This policy has involved interventio s to control the marketing, milling 
and importation of maize, and implementation of a guaranteed minimum price for 
producers.  The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives also provides farmer services to 
promote maize production.  Since 1995, Government began a series of policy and 
institutional reform under the Maize Marketing Improvement Project (MMIP).  The MMIP 
has resulted in the following reform (Oxford, 1998): 
 
 Withdrawal of Government from maize milling through the termination of NMC’s 
lease with the Swaziland Milling Company; 
 Restructuring the NMC to become an impartial maize purchasing, handling and 
storage company; 
 Transfer of ownership and responsibility for the operation and maintenance of 
Government silos from the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives’ grain section 
to NMC; and 
 Rehabilitation and expansion of the silo capacity at M tsapa from 12, 000 to 20, 
000 MT. 
 
In 1998, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives engaged Oxford Policy Management 
(OPM) to review the role, functions and ownership structure of NMC.  The consultant 
advocated for complete liberalisation of Swaziland’s trade in maize and maize meal.  The 
consultants saw no value in protecting the local maize industry, because it is so small, and 
the controls serve only to inflate food prices. 
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The OPM also recommended that Government should remov  NMC’s monopoly on the 
importation of maize and maize meal and that there should be a low or zero levy on imports 
of maize and maize meal.  These recommendations were accepted by Government but have 
still not been implemented. 
2.3.4 Maize import controls  
 
The framework of import controls that sustains the maize policy is operated by the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard), which was established by the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board Act of 1985.  To date, he NMC remains the sole importer of 
maize grain.  Imports of maize products are generally not permitted, although with cheaper 
and superior quality maize meal available in South Africa, unofficial imports occur.  Import 
permits are issued to institutions importing food ai .  The NAMBoard sets import levies 
every year on all scheduled products that include maize and maize products.  FANRPAN 
(2003) mentions that NAMBoard often has no formula to determine the maize levy, hence 
levies have often been arbitrarily set. 
2.3.5 Price policy  
 
The Government of Swaziland uses the gazetted floorprice as a tool to encourage farmers 
to produce maize with a view to reducing the need to import the staple food crop.  The 
floor price serves as a safety net in that if farmers cannot find a better price offer elsewhere, 
they are assured of the minimum price that they are entitled to get for their harvest, hence it 
also serves as a price stabilisation instrument.  This price is mainly based on the cost of 
bringing maize into Swaziland (import parity) plus a small compensation for the relatively 
higher production costs in the country (NMC, 2005).  However, the NMC also pays cartage 
allowances for those farmers who deliver more than five tons of maize directly to the 
Matsapha central depot.   The floor price is normally pplied to maize with a maximum 
moisture content of 12.5%.  However, maize with a moisture content of up 18% is 





The flaw in this policy is that the floor price is mainly based on local maize production 
costs and import parity, and not export parity.  This makes it difficult for the corporation to 
export maize, especially during times when there is a glut in the domestic market (NMC, 
2005). 
2.3.6 Farmer services  
 
Through the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Government provides both research 
and extension services to promote maize production, among other agricultural activities.  
Maize research focuses on screening new varieties for their suitability to local growing 
conditions and pest and disease resistance.  Seed trials are usually carried out in the 
Highveld and Lowveld areas.  Only drought resistant varieties are tested in the Lowveld.  
Work is also carried out on the re-introduction of open pollinated maize varieties, which 
are seen as potentially attractive to low-income subsistence farmers. 
 
Extension advice is provided through subject matter specialists, while the Grain Storage 
Section provides advice on post-harvest treatment and storage techniques.  Maize market 
information is mainly provided by the NMC. 
2.4 Consumption of maize  
 
Maize has traditionally, and remains, the staple food in Swaziland.  It is estimated that 
maize provides 64% of the average per capita energy intake (FANRPAN, 2003).  Other 
cereals consumed are wheat and rice, accounting for 10% and one percent of energy intake 
respectively (Oxford, 1998).  Neither of these grains is produced in Swaziland in 
significant quantities and at present the economic prospects for domestic production are 
unexploited. 
 
The level of maize production is dependent upon raifall and vulnerability to drought 
means that much of the population remains inherently food insecure.  In recent years, most 
people living in the drought stricken areas of the Lowveld, dry Middleveld and Lubombo 




2.5 Constraints in maize production 
 
As any other industry has its own constraints, FANRPAN (2003) summarised the 
constraints of producing maize in Swaziland as follows: 
 
 The average size of landholding on SNL is 1.7 ha, and land continues to be 
fragmented into even smaller units with time due to population growth.  This limits 
the area on which maize and other crops can be produced. 
 
 Rain has become very erratic with prolonged dry spell .  This limits soil moisture 
and seriously affects maize yields. 
 
 Soil acidity or low pH reduces the availability of nutrients in the soil and causes 
root stunting. 
 The supply of draft power on SNL often cannot meet the demand for tractors 
immediately after receiving rains due to production being rain-dependent. 
 
 The escalating cost of production, mainly of fertiliser and seed, limits adequate 
application of fertiliser and seed, leading to reduced maize yields.  Since land is 
finite and land holdings are small, the only option t  increase production lies in 
increasing productivity of each land unit.  All fertilizer is imported and transported 
over long distances, further compounding production c sts.   
 
 Financial institutions are reluctant to support maize production, particularly on 
SNL.  Part of the reason has to do with the insecure land tenure system, which 











2.6 Overview of food aid program in Swaziland 
 
The Government of Swaziland uses food aid to bridge deficits during crises.  Given the fact 
that the country has never been able to produce enough food to feed its own people, much 
of the food in the country is normally imported from neighbouring South Africa.  In times 
of crises, particularly during droughts and erratic rains or hailstorms, the situation is often 
exacerbated beyond the capabilities of being covered through commercial imports.  In such 
situations, the Government resorts to food aid to supplement commercial food imports to 
cover domestic food gaps.  Government usually provides food aid, either from its own 
resources or through requests for assistance from the in ernational community. 
 
The supply of food aid to Swaziland has varied since the early 1990’s in response to 
prevailing rainfall conditions in various parts of the country.  High levels of food aid have 
been received by the country in drought years as people could not produce enough food to 
sustain their households.  The Swaziland Government advocates for local procurement of 
commodities for food aid programmes by Government agencies, Non Governmental 
Organisations or United Nations Agencies.   
 
Information gathered from the NMC showed that local procurement gradually improved 
between 2002/3 and 2005/6 as shown in Table 2.  Agencies that have supported local 
suppliers include the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), National 
Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA) and the World Food Programme 
(WFP).  Commodities that have been bought by these agencies include maize and maize 
meal.  Maize grain was bought from the NMC, while maize meal was supplied by 
Universal Milling and Ngwane Mills.  Procurement of f od aid commodities from local 
suppliers is highly commended because it encourages farmers in high rainfall areas to 










Table 2: Local procurement of maize grain and maize meal for food aid, Swaziland 
(2002/03 – 2005/06) 
 
Maize Grain 








  718.85 





    875  
4, 930  
6, 411 






    92.00 
1500.85 
  924.75 
2, 270 









2, 209  





  700.00 
1079.00  
1, 181  
1, 544 
Sources:   National Maize Corporation (2006) and World Food Programme (2006) 
Key:  E – Emalangeni (local currency; E1 = R1) 
The World Food Programme (WFP) and the National Disaster Management Agency 
(NDMA) primarily manage the overall food aid programme in Swaziland.  Food aid in 
Swaziland is clustered under disaster relief.  By law relief programmes are governed by the 
newly formulated Disaster Management Act of 2006, which is under the mandate of the 
Deputy Prime Minister’s Office.  ‘Disaster’ is defined under the Act as a serious disruption 
of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses, 
which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope using its own resources (Disaster 
Management Act, 2006: Part I, S4).   
 
Swaziland does not have a food aid policy, instead there is a relatively new food security 
policy that was approved by Cabinet in December 2006.  The food security policy was 
developed by the Ministry of Agriculture & Cooperatives, in consultation with 
stakeholders.  The issue of food aid features in the food security policy, focusing on 
improvement of the effectiveness of food aid management.  The policy notes that 
transparency, accountability and equity at all stages must be paramount, from the 
assessment of needs to targeting of beneficiaries and the distribution process itself.   
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The WFP and the NDMA collaborate closely in various planning aspects, but 
independently implement their respective assistance programmes.  Field implementation of 
food assistance activities is generally done through various Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and other implementing partners.  The mode of implementation and 
type of activities supported can differ significantly depending on the implementing agency, 
type of beneficiaries and area of operation.  The ag ncies involved in the general relief 
programme are as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Agencies involved in the general relief programme in Swaziland, 2006 
 
Agency No. of Households 
Africa Cooperative Action Trust 15, 685 
Caritas  38, 283 
Lutheran Development Society 50, 136 
Red Cross 44, 216 
Save the Children 43, 095 
Swaziland Farmer Development Foundation 45, 153 
World Vision 73, 830 
Total 310,398 
Source.   National Disaster Management Agency, 2006 
 
The Vulnerability Assessment Committee normally takes the lead in seasonal assessments 
based on the analysis of major food security indicators, such as climate and weather, 
agricultural activities and crop production statistic , livestock conditions, and other 
household income sources.  The assessment approach is mainly qualitative and based on 
information provided by zones, supplemented by rapid rural assessment techniques.  The 
vulnerability assessment is used to estimate the siz of the vulnerable population and 
resources needed to avoid a crisis situation.  Within each region, the actual identification of 
households is done at chiefdom level where the inner council, in collaboration with the 
responsible donor agency, identifies affected households.  The inner council is a small 
committee at chiefdom level that works closely with the chief on matters related to 
development issues for that particular chiefdom. 
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A household that has been identified for benefiting under the food aid programme will 
receive assistance on a per person basis.  The ration size per person per month in kilograms 
is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Food aid ration size per person per month in Swaziland, 2006 
 
Food type Amount per person 
Cereal 12 kg 
Pulse 1.8 kg 
Corn Soya Blend 1.5 kg 
Vegetable oil  0.75 kg 
Source.  National Disaster Management Agency, 2006 
 
The total number of beneficiaries in the 2006 season was composed mainly of households 
located in the Lowveld, dry Middleveld and part of the Lubombo Plateau.  Before the worst 
drought of 1992, these areas were well known for being leaders in cotton production.  
However, the onset of drought, coupled with a declin  in the producer price of cotton, saw 
a majority of farmers pulling out of production.  Presently, these areas are producing 
neither cotton nor food crops and heavily rely on fod handouts for survival. 
 
The World Food Programme (WFP) undertook a major fod aid programme in Swaziland 
in response to the 2001/02 drought that resulted in widespread crop failure that affected 
most of southern Africa.  The situation was made worse by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
chronic poverty and economic decline that threatened th  lives and livelihoods of about 
250,000 people (almost a quarter of the population) in the country.  Since January 2005, the 
WFP has also been implementing a three-year Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 
(PRRO) aimed at improving food security, enhancing livelihoods and re-building 
productive capacity of the vulnerable, including HIV/AIDS infected and affected people.  
The PRRO is planned to reach an average of 250,000 beneficiaries per annum over the 
three-year period through the distribution of 49,141 tons of food commodities. A total of 
seven activities are currently being implemented by the WFP PRRO.  The targeting criteria 
and distribution according to agro-ecological zones is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: WFP food aid activities in Swaziland 
 
Activity Targeting criteria Distribution zones 
Support to anti 
retroviral treatment 
(ART) patients 
The beneficiaries are food insecure and with no 
means or evidence of support or showing symptoms 
of malnutrition and are patients on anti retroviral 
treatment (ART), direct observatory treatment 
shorts (DOTS) and prevention from mother to child 
plus (PMTCT+).  
The whole country 




affected by AIDS 
The beneficiaries are households that are food 
insecure and with their breadwinners on anti 




Support to orphan 
and vulnerable 
children (OVCs) in 
neighbourhood 
care points (NCPs) 
 Vulnerable children that attend neighbourhood care 
points (NCPs) and are food insecure. Vulnerability 
of the children can be caused by:  
• Guardian or parents incapable of caring for the 
children 
• Lives in a poor sibling headed household 
•  Lacks access to healthcare, education, food, 
clothing, psychological care and has no shelter  
• Exposed to sexual or physical abuse 
The whole country 
including urban 
areas (503 




School targeted by WFP has the following 
characteristics: 
• Located in a food insecure area 
• Is supported by Government of Swaziland in 
terms of staffing and other pertinent inputs 





Clinic Feeding The beneficiaries are food insecure and with no 
means or evidence of support or showing symptoms 
of malnutrition, on Family planning (FP) and 
Mother and Child Health Nutrition (MCHN) in 
health facilities 
The whole country 
but only in rural 
clinics (56 rural 
clinics) 
Food-for-work Vulnerable households: 
• Inability to access food 
• No family members with employment 
• Little or no source of income in the household 
(vegetables, remittance income) 
• Few or no livestock assets 
• Number of children in the household and number 
of children attending school 







• Inability to access food 
• No family members with employment 
• Little or no source of income in the household 
(vegetables, remittance income) 
• Few or no livestock assets 
• Number of children in the household and number 
of children attending school 




Source:  World Food Programme (2006) 
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WFP’s intervention in the country’s affected areas is very commendable mainly because 
they have contributed to the household food security of he most vulnerable groups at three 
levels.  These are: food availability in physical stocks, access to food through entitlements, 































This chapter provides an insight into global debates on the benefits and disadvantages of 
food aid in developing and least developed countries.  The chapter begins by defining food 
aid and then discusses the importance of food aid to beneficiaries.  The discussion on the 
importance of food aid is followed by a review of cmmodities typically involved in food 
aid programs, donors, recipient countries, mode of distribution and sources of procurement.  
The food aid disincentive effect is then reviewed, followed by a discussion on the 
relationship between commercial imports and food aid.   
 
3.2 Defining food aid 
 
Various authors define food aid differently.  ODI (2000:1) defines food aid as, “a 
commodity that is used either to support food assistance actions or to fund development, by 
providing balance-of-payments support in substituting for commercial imports, budgetary 
support through the counterpart funds generated from sales revenue.”  Von Braun (2003), 
as cited by Lowder and Raney (2005:1), defines food ai  as, “all food-supported 
interventions aimed at improving the food security of poor people in the short and long 
term, whether funded via international, national or public sources.”  Food aid can also be 
defined as, “the international sourcing of concessional resources in the form of, or for the 
provision of food” (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005:2).  On another note, Barrett (2006b:1) 
considers food aid as, “an instrument for addressing acute and chronic food insecurity in 
low income communities.” 
 
In a food aid meeting held in Berlin, Germany in 2003, defining food aid at first seemed 
easy but food aid experts struggled to agree on a common definition (Lowder and Raney, 
2005).  Eventually, a definition was agreed upon, that food aid includes all domestic 
actions and domestically funded distribution of food as well as non-food resources used for 
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food security purposes (Lowder and Rany, 2006).  As such, the Berlin definition is similar 
to what is generally considered as Food Based Interventions (FBIs).  Food Based 
Interventions are food distributions, market interventions and/or financial transfers that are 
funded nationally or internationally with the aim of improving food security (Clay, 2005).  
The components of the ‘Berlin definition’ were also echoed by Maunder (2006) who in his 
definition of food aid mentioned that food aid is not to be equated solely with in-kind 
transfers of food provided to victims of disasters. 
 
3.3 Importance of food aid 
 
Although food aid programmes were not originally focused on humanitarian objectives, the 
intent of most food aid today is to relieve unnecessary human suffering (Barrett, 2006a).  In 
a world in which nearly half the population survives on US $2 per day or less, more than 
800 million people go to sleep hungry, and given that a child dies every five seconds due to 
hunger-related causes, the need to respond to the need for food is ever-present and 
widespread (Barrett, 2006b). 
 
The implications of food aid for addressing hunger are perhaps more obvious when the 
number of beneficiaries receiving food aid in a given year is considered (WFP, 2004).  The 
World Food Programme (WFP) distributes about 40% of gl bal humanitarian food aid each 
year.  If the food aid indeed reaches the hungry, then humanitarian food aid is potentially 
important to the short run access to food for many who suffer from hunger (Lowder and 
Raney, 2006). 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, observations are that per capita food production has been declining 
over the years (1970-2002), and food aid has played  major role in reducing the food gap 
(Gebreselassie, 2006; Verheye, 2001).  This is clearly reflected in Figure 2 that shows the 
trends of per capita food production and food aid flows in sub-Saharan Africa between 
1970 and 2002. 
 
The reasons behind the decline in per capita food pr uction include frequent droughts, 
low productivity, limited access by farming households to improved technology, declining 
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soil fertility and Government macro-economic policies that are not fully supportive of the 
agricultural sector (FAO/WFP, 2005).  For instance, Southern African Development 
Community (2005) reports that almost all SADC member states have still not achieved the 
Dar-es-Salaam declaration target of allocating at le st 10% of their national budgets to the 
agricultural sector. 
   
 
Figure 2: Per capita food production and food aid flows in sub-Saharan Africa, 1970 – 
2002 (FAO, 2003) 
 
In (SADC), cereal production has been declining, whereas commercial imports and food 
aid, that were both declining in the mid 1990’s, after reaching a peak in the drought of 
1994, have been steadily increasing over the past four years.    
 
In 2005, at least 15 million people benefited from food aid programmes in SADC as a 
result of the drought that continues to affect the region (Integrated Regional Information 
Network, 2005).  Almost half of the population in Lesotho and a quarter of the population 
in Swaziland were reported to be in risk of hunger in 2005.  In Malawi, some 1.7 million 
people needed assistance in 2005 and in Zimbabwe almost 2.3 million needed food aid in 
the same year (IRIN, 2005).  
 
External assistance programmes in the form of food aid are therefore believed to help 
relieve effects of food shortages in affected countries (Bezuneh et al, 1998; Shaw and Clay, 
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1993).  If targeted in ways that do not displace domestic production, food aid can play a 
significant role in addressing hunger (Cohen, 2000) as food aid helps to meet the needs of 
households that would not normally afford food eithr through markets or production 
(Bezuneh et al, 1998; Webb, 2003). 
 
3.4 Food aid commodities  
 
The majority of food aid consists mainly of cereals that include wheat, maize and rice, and 
other non-cereal commodities.  Wheat is the most popular form of food aid, followed by 
maize and rice.  Food aid data provided by the World Food Programme (WFP, 2005) 
classify food aid commodities into cereals and non cereals.  The cereals are as mentioned 
above (wheat, maize and rice), whereas non-cereal poducts include skimmed milk powder, 
vegetable oil, butter, oil and other dairy products.  Cereal food aid, as can be seen from 




Figure 3: Global food aid by commodity type, 1970 – 2003 (International Food Aid 







Provision of food aid has been dominated by a few donors over the years.  This section 
identifies the donors who have dominated global food aid programmes since 1970.  The 
International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) dataset provides a list of 217 
donors that include the United States of America (USA), the European Commission (EC), 
79 individual countries, the World Food Programme (WFP), and Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGO’s).  The leading food aid donor, according to WFP (2005), is the 
USA.  Since 1970 USA has contributed, on average, six million tons of cereal food aid 
annually and has been the source of about 60% of total cereal food aid (WFP, 2005).  Other 
major donors, in decreasing order of importance are: th  European Commission, Japan, 
Australia and Canada (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005).  China and India have also emerged as 
donors of food aid in recent years (Webb, 2003).  Figure 4 presents the levels of cereal food 




EC = European Commission 
USA = United States of America 
 





Cereal food aid supplied to Swaziland between the period of 1990 – 2003 has been 
dominated by the USA that provides 42% of total cereal food aid supplied to Swaziland.  
As shown in Figure 5, the USA is followed by the European Commission (EC) with 21% 
of cereal food aid and Switzerland that contributed 13% of total cereal food aid.  The rest 




























































EC = European Commission 
USA = United States of America 
 
Figure 5: Levels of cereal food aid shipments to Swaziland by donor, 1990 – 2003 
(INTERFAIS, 2005). 
 
3.6 Recipients of food aid 
 
According to WFP (2005), the two regions receiving the most cereal food aid 
internationally are sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.  In the 1970’s, most food aid was 
channelled  to Asia, but by the 1980’s, especially fter the huge gains in food security due 
to the results of Green Revolution, Asia became less of a focus for food aid.  In the 1990’s 
and 2000, food aid to Asia declined and sub-Saharan Africa began to receive larger 
quantities.  Recipients of the ten largest amounts be ween 1988 - 2003 in decreasing order, 
were: Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Russia, North Korea, Egypt, Mozambique, India, Sudan, 
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Indonesia and Peru.  The majority of recipients (48 countries) are located in sub-Saharan 
Africa, seven countries in Asia, 31 countries in Latin America, 17 countries in Eastern 
Europe, 15 countries in both North America and the Middle East (WFP, 2005).  Figure 6 





LAC = Latin American countries 
MENA = Middle East and North America 
EECIS = Eastern Europe and Commonwealth Independent States 
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Figure 6: Global cereal food aid by recipient region, 1988 – 2003 (INTERFAIS, 2005) 
 
 
The distribution of food aid from donor countries to recipient countries takes various forms 







3.7 Mode of distribution 
 
There are three major modes of food aid distribution, namely: programme food aid, project 
food aid and emergency food aid (WFP, 2005). 
• Programme food aid is either donated or sold at a concessional price to the 
Government of a recipient country which then sells the food on the national market 
(WFP, 2005). 
• Project food aid is distributed for free (or in exchange for work) to participants in 
programmes typically run by Non-Governmental Organis tions (NGOs) that are 
intended to promote agriculture and/or economic development.  Examples include 
food-for-work, school feeding and mother-to-child nutrition schemes (WFP, 2005). 
• Emergency food aid is distributed to the food insecur  in times of crises such as 
war, famine and/or drought (WFP, 2005).  Emergency food aid is sometimes 
referred to as humanitarian or relief food aid. 
 
Figure 7 shows global cereal food aid by mode of distribution (programme, project or 
emergency) from 1978 – 2003.  Figure 7 shows that programme food aid used to dominate 
global food aid flows.  However, reports from the WFP show that this has since declined.  
Decreases in the allocation of programme food aid are l rgely the result of increased 
emphasis on humanitarian aid and of less abundant stocks of cereals in donor countries as 
trade liberalisation takes the centre stage.  Recent increases in emergency aid and relative 
stagnation of project food aid are likely due to donor fatigue as a result of lack of evidence 
that project food aid fosters development, concerns over distortion resulting from 





Figure 7: Global cereal food aid by distribution mode, 1978 – 2003 (INTERFAIS, 
2005). 
 
In the case of Swaziland, emergency food aid has been the dominant food aid programme 
between 1990 and 2003 and accounted for 71% of total food aid received by the country.  
Figure 8 shows that emergency food aid was followed by project food aid that accounted 
for 26%, whereas programme food aid accounted for only 3% of total food aid support to 
Swaziland.  Supply of emergency food aid began to increase in 1991/1992 in response to 
the drought that hit the entire SADC region.  In 1997, 2000 and 2001, no food aid support 
was recorded by INTERFAIS for Swaziland. 
 


























3.8 Local and regional procurement of food aid 
 
Where in-kind food aid distribution has been assessed by donor agencies to be an 
appropriate option for intervention, the source of procurement is a critical factor in 
determining the market and production disincentives of food aid (Maunder, 2006).  When 
sufficient food is available in-country, either through domestic production or commercial 
imports, local procurement of food aid is preferred by recipient countries to reduce the risk 
of market distortions and support local trade system  (Maunder et al, 2006). However, 
where adequate food is not available on local markets, the next best option to consider is 
the use of regional procurement (otherwise known as tri ngular food aid transaction).  Like 
local purchase, regional procurement has ancillary benefits of improving the timeliness of 
delivery, providing appropriate food rather than conflicting with local consumption 
patterns and supporting establishing national and local marketing structures and producers 
(Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). 
 
Until the mid 1990’s, local and regional purchases represented about ten percent of global 
cereal food aid, but they have grown to more substantial amounts in recent years, 
fluctuating between 12-20% of total cereal food aid (WFP, 2005).  The USA and Canada 
provide the majority of their food aid in kind, whereas most local and regional purchases 
are undertaken by other donors, including Japan, Australia, the European Commission and 
World Food Programme (WFP).  In the year 2000, WFP purchased more than 25% of the 
food used in its operations through local and regional purchases (Barrett and Maxwell, 
2005).   
 
Figure 9 presents a comparison between figures of food aid supplied either through direct 





DT = Direct transfer 
LP = Local purchase 
TFAT = Triangular food aid transaction 
 
 




In the case of Swaziland, between 1990 and 2003, food aid was dominated by supplies 
through direct transfers from donors.  Only in 1994 was food aid supplied for the first time 
through triangular purchases and local procurement.  As reflected in Figure 10, between 
1990 and 2003, direct transfers accounted for 67% of total food aid supplied to Swaziland, 
followed by triangular purchases with 17% and local procurement with 16%.  The 
Government of Swaziland is making efforts to convince food aid suppliers to consider 
buying food aid items in domestic markets as this will contribute significantly towards 





















































DT = Direct transfer 
LP = Local purchase 
TFAT = Triangular food aid transaction 
 
Figure 10: Total food aid supplied to Swaziland by mode of procurement, 1990 – 2003 
(INTERFAIS, 2005). 
 
3.9 Disincentive effects of food aid 
 
The debate over food aid, according to Lowder (2004), dates back to 1959 from an article 
written by Cochrane (1959), claiming that agricultural supplies from the USA could be 
dispensed in the form of food aid to promote economic development in poor countries.   
Schultz (1960) published a rebuttal of Cochrane’s argument in an article that warned that 
food-for-peace is likely to have an adverse impact on farmers in recipient countries 
(Lowder, 2004; Barrett, 1999).  Schultz (1960) was so influential that even today, more 
than 40 years later, disincentives for food production in recipient countries remain at the 
heart of every food aid debate (Tapio-Bistrom, 2001; Lowder, 2004). 
 
De Carvalho (1999) argues that besides the immediate welfare improvements brought by 
food aid to food deficient countries, particularly during emergencies, such interventions 
bring negative consequences in terms of sustainable development and food security 
improvement.  Most food aid critics are concerned that food aid programmes could be 
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counter-productive or even contribute to long-term food insecurity in recipient countries 
(Schneider, 2005). 
 
Disincentive effects of food aid on domestic agricultural production may result from farm 
level responses to price reduction caused by increased food supplies (Clark, 2001) and 
dependency effects at the Government level that reduce incentives to emphasise 
agricultural development in central Government policy (Doroch and Subbarao, 2005). 
Households that are normally food insecure and benefit from food aid, are sometimes both 
producers and consumers and face low prices when they sell their produce at harvest time 
and high prices when they buy food later in the year (Gabreselassie, 2006). 
 
With reference to the case of Malawi, it was discovered that food aid supplies in 2002/2003 
season reduced demand for commercial maize, resulting in unintended excess stocks of 
commercial maize, which exerted a dampening effect on consumer prices during the year 
and producer prices for the next harvest (Jere, 2007). 
 
Food aid can drive down local (national) food prices in at least three ways (Barrett, 2006).  
First, monetisation of food aid can flood the market, l ading to an increased supply.  
Second, households receiving food aid may decrease demand for the commodity received 
or for locally produced substitutes.  Third, recipients may sell food aid to purchase other 
necessities or complements and by so doing, they drive down prices of the food aid 
commodity and its substitutes, but also increase demand for the complements (Barrett, 
2006a). 
 
Donovan et al (2006) acknowledge the fact that food aid has disincentives to recipient 
countries.  However, they feel that the negative eff cts of food aid can only be realised 
when certain conditions prevail.  According to Donovan et al (2006), food aid can have 
strong negative effects, when: 
 
• Food aid is distributed during harvest time; 
• Very large quantities of food aid are released directly into countries with markets 
that operate with similar locally produced products;   
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• Poor commodity targeting is implemented, such that t e food aid commodities 
given to households are likely to be exchanged in markets, particularly when that 
commodity has a local substitute such that the increased market supplies lower 
prices for the locally produced substitute; 
• Corruption leads to food aid never reaching intended recipients but rather diverted 
onto the markets; and 
• Uncertainty in food aid programming (and national Government planning) results in 
constantly changing estimates of food aid needs and Government policy responses, 
such that traders face high risks and become reluctant to engage in trade. 
 
Inconsistency in terms of food aid management on the Government side can also occur. For 
example, Government can release grain provided under a food aid programme into the 
market at below market price.  In such a situation, reduced trade volumes and profitability 
may serve to undermine private trade confidence in the market and reduce private 
investment that, in the extreme, can lead to disinvestment and business closure (Maunder, 
2006).  
 
Political disincentives also constitute a substantial dimension in the food aid debate 
(Dorosh and Subbarao, 2005).  As food aid has focused increasingly on emergencies over 
the past decade, its use in areas of civil conflict has expanded.  Barrett (2006) notes that, 
although food aid is universally intended to provide relief to food insecure people, it has, 
on occasions, been inadvertently used as an instrument for oppression and violence by 
political leaders.  Food deliveries have been manipulated by political leaders so as to deny 
disfavoured populations access to food, secure the allegiance of other populations in 
political contests, and augment military food supplies (Maunder, 2006).  This issue has 
become a real concern to the donor community (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). 
 
Food aid may also dissuade local Governments from taking initiatives and using national 
resources to tackle problems of food insecurity (Maunder et al, 2006).  Food aid can also 
foster the continuation of ineffective policies such as highly inefficient food subsidy 
programmes underpinned by food aid shipment programmes that largely benefit the middle 
and upper classes (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005).  However, attempts to use food aid-tied 
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conditions to foster useful policy reforms in recipient countries have generally been a 
failure as no tangible results have been seen in targeted countries (Barrett, 2006a). 
 
General observations, according to Barrett (2002), Tschirley and Howard (2003) and 
Schneider (2005), are that the balance of positive and negative effects of food aid on 
domestic agriculture depend critically on how the food aid was managed, delivered, and 
distributed within the recipient country and on the country’s overall economic and 
agricultural sector policies. 
 
3.10 Food aid and commercial imports 
 
A few studies have examined the impact of food aid on commercial imports.  Findings by 
Ruttan (1993) and Ball et al (1996) reflect that countries with low production levels are 
often considered needier and receive more targeted food aid.  Lavy (1990) found evidence 
that low production causes increased food aid receipts.  Production levels are not the only 
determinants of food aid allocation but commercial imports also play a role as they are 
correlated with the amount of food aid allocated by donors (Lowder, 2004). 
 
Since targeted food aid is allocated largely on the basis of need, countries with a poor 
ability to import food are more likely to receive targeted food aid, hence commercial 
imports and food aid are negatively correlated (Barrett, 1998).  Lowder (2004), in a study 
covering global food aid and import data between 1988 to 2001, concluded that 
programme food aid displaces commercial imports on a one on one basis.  In another 
international study, Clay et al (2005) cited by Maunder (2006), found that one kilogram of 
food aid displaced 0.7 kg of commercial imports.  Tiba (2002) states that between half and 
three-quarters of all food aid acted as a substitute for commercial imports, although it is 
not clear how this estimate is derived.  Barrett (1999) also found a negative correlation 
between the United States of America’s programme food aid and contemporaneous 
commercial imports.  Maunder (2006) drew a conclusion from the above findings, stating 
that only when commercial imports are fully displaced will food aid compete with 
domestic production.   
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3.11 Quantitative methods of analysing the impact of food aid on agricultural 
production 
 
The proponents and critics of food aid have strong a d divergent opinions on the incidence 
and severity of the production and market impacts of fo d aid.  However, these debates are 
often grounded on anecdotal, rather than based on acareful examination of empirical 
evidence.   
 
It is not easy to arrive at a concise conclusion on whether food aid affects agricultural 
production, given the mixed evidence of past studies (Tapio-Bistrom, 2001; Lowder, 2004).  
Evaluating the degree of effectiveness of food aid is presently a divisive issue within the 
donor community, since many Governments prefer assessm nts based on food aid 
deliveries rather than on effectiveness of aid in recipient countries (Schneider, 2005).  
  
Tapio-Bistrom (2001) used a reduced-form market equilibri m model to analyse the impact 
of food aid on food production in Tanzania.  This was a national level study that involved 
the use of secondary data covering the years between 1971 – 1996 and included variables 
such as quantity of maize produced, official and unofficial maize prices, fertilizer costs, 
agricultural labour costs, rainfall data, transport costs, variance of open market price, 
variance of food aid, total food aid and total commercial maize imported.  The impact of 
food aid was measured using the reduced-form market equilibrium model that consisted of 
quantity and price functions estimated simultaneously ing the above variables through a 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method.  Empirical findings did not 
indicate a statistically significant disincentive effect of food aid on maize production and 
maize producer price in Tanzania. 
 
Lavy (1990) and Abdulai et al (2004) used a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to study 
the impact of food aid on food production in 33 and 42 sub-Saharan countries, respectively. 
Swaziland was included in the 2004 study conducted by Abdulai et al.  Lavy (1990) used 
secondary data (1970 - 1987) to estimate equations f r food production and food aid.  
Results obtained from this study showed that food aid h d a significant positive effect on 
food production.  The positive net effect of food ai on food production suggested that any 
disincentive induced by the additional supply of food was offset by the positive effect of 
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food aid on food production.  Lavy (1990) attributes this to the benefits of relaxing 
liquidity constraints and increased fertilizer consumption which he says, outweighed price 
disincentives. 
 
Abdulai et al (2004) used secondary data (1970 – 2000) to estimate a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model for 42 sub-Saharan countries who had benefited from food aid interventions.  
The estimation results showed that, on average, food aid exerts a positive impact on food 
production.  The study discovered that the positive net effect of food aid on food 
production indicated that any disincentive effects due to depressed product prices induced 
by food aid shipments were more than offset by positive risk management and factor price 
effects.   This is not to say that food aid is necessarily the best possible resource to use for 
rural development interventions, but that rural sub-Saharan Africa is so starved for 
resources that any reasonably well-managed aid programme can have net beneficial effects, 
despite the well known product market disincentive effects associated with food aid 
(Abdulai et al, 2004). 
 
Lowder (2004) also used a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis that differentiated the 
analysis for programme and emergency food aid.  Thesample included all 145 global food 
recipients between 1988 and 2001.  The study found that neither programme nor 
emergency food aid was significantly associated with changes in domestic agricultural 
production. 
 
A Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) method of estimation was used by Demeke et al 
(2004) to study the effect of food aid dependency at the macro-economy level and the 
effects of food aid on agricultural production at household level in Ethiopia.  The macro- 
economic effect of food aid was analysed using natio l time series data from 1980 – 2001.  
The system of equations specified in the model consisted of six equations (five stochastic 
equations and one identity equation describing the equilibrium between demand and supply 
for food aid).  The equations used five endogenous variables (total quantity of local grain, 
per capita domestic demand for grain, per capita consumer’s disposable income, 
commercial imports, and food grain producer price), and six exogenous variables (weather 
index, index for non-agricultural production, world price of food grain, food aid, retail 
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price for food grain, and total foreign exchange flows).  The equations were estimated in a 
linearised double-log form using 3SLS.  The results of the study revealed that at the macro-
economic level, food aid increased the total domestic supply of food grains.  However, a 
sustained increase in food aid quantity was found to have dampening effects on domestic 
production of food grain.  Therefore, the effects of food aid on the agricultural sector 
appeared to be significantly negative as it put downward pressure on food grain producer 
prices. 
 
To evaluate the impact of food aid at household level, Demeke et al (2004) used data 
collected from a household survey of 1469 households in Ethiopia.  A supply model was 
developed where the dependent variable was the quantity of food grain produced.  The 
model was estimated in a linearised double-log form using independent variables such as 
food aid per capita, participation in an extension programme, quantity of fertilizer used, 
possession of draft animals and land holding size.  Using the total sample size, the effect of 
the food aid on total food grain produced was not significant.  However, after the sample 
was truncated, to include only households that receiv d food aid, the re-estimated model 
showed a statistically significant negative influenc  of food aid on food production at 
household level.  Concentrating only on food aid recipi nt households was justified by the 
fact that, if food aid had any significant effect at household level, that effect would be more 
evident in the households involved in the food aid programme than the non-recipient 
households. 
 
A recent review  by Abdulai (2005) on disincentives, distortions, displacement and 
dependency effects of food aid failed to find strong empirical evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that food aid significantly displaces domestically produced food on recipient 
country markets. 
 
The next section identifies the appropriate analytical tool to apply in this study.  This is 
done by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the most widely used and preferred 
analytical tools for studying the effects of food ai on local maize production. 
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3.12 Identifying the appropriate analytical tools for analysing the effects of food aid 
on local maize production 
 
Literature has shown that country-specific impact studies (Tapio-Bistrom, 2001; Demeke et 
al, 2004) are analysed through the use of a market equilibrium model, where the effects of 
exogenous variables such as food aid can be analysed through solving simultaneous 
equations of the quantity function and price function.  There are several possible techniques 
that can be applied to solve simultaneous equations, including the Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML), Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS), Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS), Limited Information/Maximum Likelihood (LIML), Least-Squares-No 
Restriction (LSNR) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods (Kuotsoyiannis, 1992; 
Gujarati, 1995).  Of the above tools, the FIML and 2SLS methods are the most widely used 
(Bollen, 1996).   
 
The Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method, which uses a single equation framework, is 
preferred when the data set is not that large as itis capable of successfully eliminating the 
degrees of freedom problem (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1979:295; Bollen, 1996: 120-
121). It is also an efficient estimator for reduced form equations even in the presence of 
multicollinearity (Kuotsoyiannis, 1992:510).  The 2SLS method may also be less sensitive 
to specification errors in the sense that those parts of the system that are correctly specified 
may not be affected appreciably by errors of specificat on in other parts (Klein, 1974 cited 
by Gujarati, 1995; Kuotsoyiannis, 1992:511).  
 
The FIML method, on the other hand, is preferred mainly because it estimates all the 
identified structural equations together as a set, instead of estimating the structural 
parameters of each equation separately.  The main disadvantage is that, if there is a 
specification error (a wrong functional form or exclusion of relevant variables) in one or 
more equations of the system, that error is transmitted to the rest of the system, hence the 






3.13 Summary  
 
This chapter has shown that food aid is a complex mode of assistance that has both 
advantages and disadvantages.  The debate on food aid disincentives began more than 40 
years ago and is still being researched in a number of countries at various levels.  A number 
of analytical tools have been used to study the impact of food aid on agriculture.  Country 
specific impact studies assume that the reduced-form market equilibrium approach, which 
when correctly formulated, is capable of analysing the impact of food aid on both the 
quantity of agricultural produce and agricultural producer price.   
 
The objective of this study is to study empirically whether food aid does have a 
disincentive effect on maize production in Swaziland.  Similar studies such as Tapio-
Bistrom (2001) and Demeke et al (2004) have used the reduced-form market equilibrium 
model to study the impact of food aid on maize production in Tanzania and Ethiopia, 

























This chapter presents the methodology used to analyse the impact of food aid on maize 
production and maize producer price in Swaziland.  It begins by discussing the research 
design, which is followed by methods of data collection.  The collected data are then 
discussed in the context of how they were used as variables in the analysis.  The last 
section reviews the analysis used to answer the sub-problems given in Chapter 1. 
 
4.2 Research design 
 
The overall objective of the study was to provide empirical evidence on whether food aid 
has a disincentive effect on maize production in Swaziland.  The methodology adopted for 
this study is similar to that of Tapio-Bistrom (2001) that was applied to investigate the 
impact of food aid on Tanzania’s maize industry.  An econometric model was used to 
conduct an empirical measurement and testing of the res arch hypothesis. 
 
Tapio-Bistrom’s method was modified because of differences between the maize industries 
in Swaziland and Tanzania.  Tapio-Bistrom (2001) separated the maize market into two 
(formal and open markets) in order to identify which market reliably represented the maize 
industry in Tanzania.  The significant market was then used to formulate the reduced form 
market equilibrium model.  For this particular study, separating the maize markets was not 
feasible because there are no available data on quatities of maize traded in the open 
market, except for maize prices, which are regularly collected by the National Early 
Warning Unit (NEWU).  If food aid has an impact on maize production, the expectation is 
that it would have an impact on the entire industry, i respective of whether a farmer is 
producing maize to be sold in the official market or open market.  It is against this 
background that this study resorted to the use of a single maize production equation, which 
was tested for significance before formulating the reduced form market equilibrium model. 
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Tapio-Bistrom (2001) also included a variable on the minimum wage rate as a proxy for 
labour cost in maize production.  In the Swaziland situation, it is on record (GoS, 2000) 
that more than 90% of the maize produced in Swaziland comes from smallholder farmers 
located on Swazi Nation Land (SNL).  These are farmers who produce maize on an average 
land size of 1.7 ha using family labour.  The variable of labour cost was, therefore, not 
included in this study.  
 
4.3 Methods of data collection 
 
The analysis relied on secondary national data from1985 to 2006.  Data were sourced from 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (National Early Warning Unit), Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Energy, National Maize Corporation, Central Statistics Office, 
Swaziland Meteorological Service, World Food Programme (INTERFAIS), Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and local agricultural etail outlets that supply farm inputs. 
 
Table 6 presents types of data collected for analysis and their respective sources.  The year 
1985 was used as the cut-off year simply because available records from the various data 
sources did not have reliable data in the years before 1985.  For some variables data were 
available dating as far back as the early 1970’s.  However, that alone could not suffice 
since the analysis required the data set to have complete observations on all variables in the 












Table 6: Data sources for variables used in analysing the impact of food aid on maize 
production in Swaziland 
 
Data Unit Source 
Quantity of cereal food aid 
(FA) 
Metric tons World Food Programme 
(INTERFAIS) and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
Commercial maize imports (I) Metric tons National Maize Corporation 
Local maize production (Q) Metric tons Central Statis ics Office and  
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives  (National Early 
Warning Unit), Swaziland 
Official maize producer prices 
( p ) 
Emalangeni per 
ton 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (National Early 
Warning Unit), Swaziland 
Open market maize producer 
prices 
( p~ ) 
Emalangeni per 
ton 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (National Early 










Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Energy, Swaziland 
Rainfall (D) Millimetres Swaziland Meteorological Service 
Total area planted to maize 
(LM) 
Hectares Central Statistics Office, 
Swaziland 
 
A brief discussion on the nature of each variable considered is presented below: 
 
 Local maize production refered to the total quantity of maize produced by local 
farmers, both commercial and smallholder farmers. 
 
 Total cereal food aid refered to food aid quantities r ceived by Swaziland and 
includes all cereal items such as maize, rice, and wheat.  It was very difficult to 
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collate the data on food aid quantities from local sources as record keeping by local 
agents is inconsistent and unreliable.  The study, therefore, resorted to using data 
provided by the International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS), under 
World Food Program (WFP), that monitors food aid deliveries worldwide. 
 
 Total commercial cereal imports included all cereals expressed in maize 
equivalents, imported through the National Agricultural Marketing Board. 
 
 Official maize producer price was the gazetted floor price set by Government, 
through the Maize Marketing Committee, at the beginning of every maize 
marketing season.  Many factors are considered when setting the price, but 
ultimately the purpose is to assist the farmer realis  a positive margin.  The gazetted 
floor price allows farmers to recover production costs and still generate profit.  The 
official maize price is primarily used by the National Maize Corporation (NMC), 
which is the sole importer of maize and buyer of last resort in the country.  Farmers 
are at liberty to sell to any buyer at any price.  The official maize producer prices 
were adjusted using the national Consumer Price Indx (1996 = 100).  This allowed 
for effective computation and comparison of official maize prices over the years 
under review.   
 
 The open market maize producer price refers to the price at which maize was sold 
in any market apart from the NMC official (or regulated) market.  The prices in the 
open market vary from area to area and from time to time.  In areas where maize is 
a scarce commodity, such as in the Lowveld and Lubombo, the prices are normally 
higher than in the Highveld where maize is a favourable crop to produce.  This 
study used average annual prices for analysis.  Thepric s were adjusted using the 
national Consumer Price Index (1996 = 100).  This allowed for effective 
computation and comparison of open maize market prices over the years under 
review.  
 
 Average fertiliser price refered to the weighted aver ge costs of common fertilisers 
used for maize production in the different agro-ecological zones.  The most 
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commonly used fertilizers in maize production in Swaziland are NPK and LAN and 
the weighted price was calculated on the basis of 70:30 in favour of NPK, which is 
most used amongst the two.  Fertiliser constitute the greater proportion of costs 
incurred in maize production (FANRPAN, 2003).  The study used retail fertiliser 
prices adjusted using the national Consumer Price Index (1996 = 100).  This 
allowed for effective computation and comparsison of fertiliser prices over the 
years under review. 
 
 Average fuel costs were used as a proxy for transport costs.  The assumption was 
that an increase in fuel costs will eventually lead to an increase in transport and land 
preparation costs.  It was difficult to identify a factor that could be used to give a 
true and reliable reflection of transport costs incurred by maize producers in the 
different locations of the country.  The fuel prices were adjusted using the national 
Consumer Price Index (1996 = 100).  This allowed for effective computation and 
comparison of fuel prices over the years under review. 
 
 Since most of the maize in Swaziland, particularly on Swazi Nation Land, is 
rainfed, it was deemed necessary to incorporate the impact of annual rainfall on the 
supply of maize.  In rainfed agricultural production, drought or abnormally low 
precipitation usually explains variations and deficit years.  Therefore, a weather 
dummy variable, constructed using rainfall statistics, was incorporated in the model.  
Yearly rainfall that was 10% below the long-term average rainfall was assumed to 
be a drought year whereas yearly rainfall above that was assumed to be a normal 
year (Tapio-Bistrom, 2001).  
 
 Total area planted to maize refered to land under maize production in a particular 
season.  It was expected that as the area under maize production increases, the total 






4.4 Data treatment and analysis 
4.4.1 Developing a maize production model 
 
First, the study developed a production model to reliably reflect the current institutional 
maize market in Swaziland.  This is a supply function formulated on local farmers’ 
behaviour in the present maize marketing system.  Maize farmers in Swaziland sell their 
produce either to the National Maize Corporation (using the gazetted price) or on the open 
market (using the open market maize price).  The production (supply) function was fitted 
using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to ascertain its significance prior to being 
used in formulating the reduced form market equilibrium model. 
 
The quantity of maize produced for the official market (Q) was expressed using the open-
maize market price (p~ ) lagged by one year, average fertilizer price (r), cost of fuel (c), 
rainfall (D) and land area under maize production (LM).  In functional form the quantity of 
maize produced for the official market was represented as follows: 
 
εαααααα ttttttt LMDrcpQ ++++++= − logloglog~loglog 5432110 ………..….…(4.1) 
Where: 
Q = Quantity of maize produced 
pt
~
1−   = Open market maize producer price, lagged by one year 
c  = Transport cost (fuel price) 
r  = Average fertilizer cost 
D  = Rainfall - annual amount of precipitation.  
1 = normal year 
0 = drought year 
LM = Land area planted to maize (ha) 
ε t  = Error term   
 
The production model used the open market price as opposed to the official market price 
because it is generally higher by 25 – 30% than the NMC official buying price (Oxford, 
1998).  Therefore, its inclusion accounted for the difference between the two prices.  The 
maize producer price was lagged by one year since at the time of planting; a farmer would 
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only know the previous year’s maize producer price.  Other variables such as transport 
cost, fertilizer price and rainfall were not lagged as they represent levels of occurrence in 
the same season as the quantity of maize produced.  For instance, if farmers plough their 
fields in October/November 2006 the decision would be based on the amount of rainfall 
received during October/November 2006 and not on amount of rainfall received in 
October/November 2005.  The same applies to prices of fertilizer and fuel.  Prices that 
would be considered are prices for October/November 2006 instead of prices for 
October/November 2005.    
 
The model was fitted using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method and results are 
presented in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.2 Reduced-form market equilibrium model – at national level 
 
Conventional economic theory states that aggregate demand and supply determine the 
market price (Cramer et al., 1997). Therefore, both demand and supply specifications were 
used to analyse the effects of food aid on the quantity of maize produced and the maize 
producer price.  The variable used for studying the impact of food aid was total quantity of 
cereal food aid received.  The food aid variable was lagged by one year to express its 
impact on the production decisions of the following year.  Lagging by one year was 
necessitated by the scarcity of data that did not permit the model to be lagged by more than 
one year.   
 
The quantity and price functions were then solved simultaneously using a 2-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method (Gujarati, 1995: 687-689).  As the name indicates, the method 
involves two successive applications of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 
The study assumed that the dummy variables, proxy variables and averages for measuring 
impact of rainfall, fuel costs and fertilizer costs, respectively, were accurate in analysing 
variations caused by rainfall, transport costs and fertilizer costs in the model.  It is also 
assumed that the maize industry in Swaziland is fully compatible with the neoclassical farm 
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production theory and the concept of market equilibrium which formed the basis for this 
study. 
 
In stage one, the two functions are expressed, where t  quantity variable is a function of 




















Q = Quantity of maize produced 
p~   = Open market maize producer price  
c  = Transport cost (Fuel price) 
r  = Average fertilizer cost 
FA = Total cereal food aid (in maize equivalents) 
D  = Rainfall - annual amount of precipitation.  
1 = normal year 
0 = drought year 
LM = Land area planted to maize (ha) 
I = Total commercial cereal imports (in maize equivalents) 
p  = Official maize producer price 
ε t  = Error term 
ut = Error term 
 
The error term assumptions are similar to those of Tapio-Bistrom (2001).  The estimation 
results will not be correct if the following Gauss Markov assumptions are not valid: 
 
 Each of the stochastic disturbance terms have a zero mean (disturbance 
assumption); 
 All stochastic disturbance terms have the same (finite) variance (homoscedasticity); 
 Each pair of stochastic disturbance terms has zero covariance (absence of serial 
correlation); 
 The disturbance term is independent of the exogenous explanatory variables; and 
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 The disturbance term is not independent of the endogen us explanatory variables. 
 
The main purpose of stage one was to obtain a reduced form of the quantity function and 
price function as expressed in Equations (4.7) and (4.11).  Stage one; however, was 
completed by fitting the first OLS on equations (4.7) and (4.11) to obtain equations (4.12) 
and (4.13), respectively.  This process allowed for the elimination of the correlation likely 
to exist between quantity and price variables with their error terms, as pointed out in 
assumption five.  Therefore, applying OLS on equations (4.12) and (4.13) gave consistent 
estimates of the parameters.  The estimations were as follows: 
 
Equation (4.3) leads to  
)4.4.........(..................loglogloglog~log 12423222101 upFAIQp tttttt −−−−−− +++++= βββββ
 














































Assumptions of (utˆ ) were similar to assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the error term, and since 
equation (4.7) no longer had the endogenous variable ( pt
~log 1− ), it meant (utˆ ) was 
uncorrelated with the exogenous explanatory variables. 
 

























































































In stage two, the estimated values of quantity and price were then substituted in the original 
equations before estimating the second OLS to obtain the final results.  The specifications 
were as follows: 
 















)15.4.(...........................logloglogˆlog~log *2141312110 upFAIQp tttttt +++++= −−−− βββββ  
 
Results obtained from stage two were then used to detect the effect of food aid, and other 
variables, on the quantity of maize produced (4.14) and maize producer price (4.15).  The 





CHAPTER 5    




This chapter presents analytical results of the impact of food aid on maize production in 
Swaziland.  The results provide answers to the following research questions:   
 
 Does food aid lead to lower prices in the domestic maize market?  
 Does food aid act as a disincentive to local maize producers such that the level of 
production is reduced in subsequent seasons? 
 
First, an estimation of the country’s maize production model is presented.  This is followed 
by the impact of food aid on maize quantity produced and maize producer price at national 
level. 
 
5.2 Estimation of a reliable country maize production model 
 
Table 7 presents the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analytical results for determining the 
significance of the predominant maize market system in Swaziland using variables such as 
open market maize price, transport cost, average fertiliz r cost, rainfall quantity and land 
area planted to maize. 
 
The F-Statistic in the maize production function was found to be significant at the one 
percent level of probability with a goodness of fit (R2) of 64%.  The function showed no 
sign of serial correlation as the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic was 2.061.  There was also 
no sign of multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables as the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each variable was less than the critical value of 10 (Gujarati, 1995:339).  
From five explanatory variables that were included in the model, only rainfall emerged 
significant at the five percent level of probability. 
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B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 






-0.430 0.227 -0.361 -1.892 0.078 0.664 1.506 
Average 
fuel price 




-0.254 0.326 -0.155 -0.780 0.448 0.615 1.626 





0.503 0.244 0.336 2.061 0.057 0.911 1.098 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.731 5 0.146 
Residual 0.418 15 
Total 1.149 20 
0.028 







The results indicate that if the amount of rainfall received increases, the total harvest of 
maize in a particular production season is also likely to increase.  However, the open 
market price lagged by one year and the amount of land planted to maize were significant 
at the 10% level of probability.   The positive linear relationship between area planted to 
maize and maize produced is as expected.  However, the negative coefficient of the lagged 
open market price is contrary to expectations.  This may be due to the effects of frequent 
droughts experienced in Swaziland over the study period that led to declining maize 
quantity as a result of reduced yields and total area planted to maize  
 
As the model was found to be statistically significant and with all variables, except for the 
open market price, showing coefficient signs in concurrence with a priori expectations, the 
production function was then used as a basis to formulate the reduced form model for 
analyzing the impact of food aid on the country’s maize industry. 
 
5.3 Impact of food aid on maize quantity produced and maize producer price 
 
The impact of food aid on maize production in Swaziland was analysed by solving 
simultaneous equations (quantity function and price function) using a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method.  In the 2SLS method, the analysis involved two successive 
applications of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
 
In stage one, OLS was applied to regress log Qt  (equation 4.7) on all the pre-determined 
variables to obtain log Qtˆ (equation 4.12).  OLS was also applied to regress log pt
~ (equation 
4.11) on all the predetermined variables to obtain log pt~̂ (equation 4.13). 
 
Tables 8 and 9 present results obtained from estimating equations (4.7) and (4.11) using 
OLS.  As these were intermediate results, there was no need to interpret them at this stage.  















B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 






-0.811 0.554 -0.723 -1.463 0.194 0.202 4.958 
Quantity of 
food aid 
lagged by  
two years 















-0.192 0.159 -0.563 -1.207 0.273 0.227 4.414 




1.203 0.546 0.880 2.192 0.071 0.305 3.277 
Average fuel 
price 
-0.172 0.303 -0.205 -0.568 0.591 0.379 2.637 
ANOVA  Model Summary 
Model Sum of 
Squares 















Total 0.854 14 
0.042 
1.789 0.247 0.705 2.201 
 
One variable, Qt 2− was excluded when estimating the model using OLS as it showed a 
tolerance level of 0.00, hence providing a source of multicollinearity within the model.  In 




Table 9: OLS results for estimating open market maize producer price (pt~ ), 









B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 










by one year 



































by one year 
-0.553 0.421 -0.578 -1.313 0.246 0.168 5.967 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.554 9 0.062 
Residual 0.108 5 
Total 0.668 14 
0.022 
2.870 0.129 0.838 2.970 
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The results obtained in stage one, where OLS was used to fit equations (4.7) and (4.11), 
gave the unstandardised coefficients for estimating Qtˆ and pt~̂ as shown in equations (4.12) 
and (4.13).  Estimated quantity (Qtˆ ) was then substituted in the price function (4.14) and 
estimated price (pt~̂ ) was likewise substituted in the quantity function (4.15) and the two 
equations were then solved simultaneously to analyse the impact of explanatory variables, 
including food aid, on the quantity of maize produced and maize producer price. 
 
Table 10 presents the results obtained when estimating the quantity function (4.14) after 
replacing the price with its estimate.  This is thesame function that analysed the impact of 
food aid, amongst other variables, on quantity of maize produced. 
 
Table 10: OLS results for analysing impact of food aid on quantity of maize 









B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 




by one year 









0.220 0.092 0.580 2.377 0.063 0.438 2.285 




1.103 0.350 0.818 3.155 0.025 0.387 2.585 
Average 
fuel price 
0.527 0.213 0.561 2.469 0.057 0.503 1.988 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.622 6 0.104 5.576 0.040 0.870 2.890 
Residual 0.093 5 0.019     
Total 0.714 11      
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The F-statistic of the maize quantity function was significant at the five percent level of 
probability with a goodness of fit of 87%.  Although the DW appeared to be within the 
inconclusive range, the function, however, showed no sign of multicollinearity amongst the 
explanatory variables.  From a total of six explanatory variables that were included in the 
model, only two emerged significant at the five percent level of probability namely, the 
estimated open market price, lagged by one year, and amount of land planted to maize.  
The coefficients of quantity of food aid (lagged by one year) and average fuel price were 
significant at the 10% level of probability. 
 
If food aid had a negative impact on quantity of maize produced, the food aid variable 
would be significant and negative.  However, evidence shown in Table 10 proved 
otherwise as the food aid variable emerged positive and significant at the 10% level of 
probability, which suggests that there is no signifcant negative relationship between 
quantity of maize produced and food aid received by Swaziland. Instead, this could mean 
that the reduction in local maize production increases the demand for food aid.  As 
mentioned earlier, donor agencies have in recent years increased the procurement of local 
and regionally supplied food commodities to feed households in the affected areas.  
Consequently, farmers who are able to produce under the current drought conditions are 
taking full advantage of the situation, more so, since producer prices have increased 
substantially.    
 
Table 11 presents the results obtained when using OLS on the price function (equation 
4.15) after replacing the quantity of maize produced with its estimate.  This is the same 
function that analysed the impact of food aid, amongst other variables, on maize producer 
price. 
 
The F-statistic of the maize producer price function was not significant and the goodness of 
fit was 30.4% which is below the acceptable level of R2 (Gujarati 1995:202; Koutsoyiannis, 
1992:122).  The function, though, showed no sign of multicollinearity amongst the 
explanatory variables as the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable was less than 
the critical value of 10.  As the model itself was not significant, none of the explanatory 
variables were found to be significant, including the variable on quantity of food aid.  The 
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results, therefore, show that there is no significant relationship between food aid and maize 
producer price in Swaziland. 
 
Table 11: OLS results for analysing impact of food aid on maize open market 









B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 























-0.017 0.402 -0.014 -0.042 0.967 0.899 1.113 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.158 4 0.040 
Residual 0.362 7 
Total 0.520 11 
0.052 
0.766 0.580 0.304 1.211 
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5.4 Improving the degrees of freedom 
 
Recognising the low degrees of freedom in the analytic l results, an attempt was made to 
eliminate variables with parameter estimates that were not significant at least at the 20% 
level of probability.  Consequently, two variables, namely, average fuel price and average 
fertilizer price were eliminated at the first stage of the analytical process where the 
country’s maize production function was determined.  The original analytical framework 
was maintained, meaning the impact of food aid on maize quantity produced and maize 
producer price was analysed in the same format as in the first attempt but this time with the 
exclusion of average fuel price and average fertilizer price.  The results obtained in the 
second attempt are presented below. 
 
5.4.1 Estimation of a reliable country maize production model 
 
Table 12 presents the OLS analytical results for determining the significance of the 
predominant maize market system in Swaziland using the following variables:  open 
market maize price, rainfall quantity and amount of land planted to maize. 
 
The F-Statistic in the maize production function was found to be significant at the one 
percent level of probability with a goodness of fit (R2) of 61%.  The function showed no 
sign of serial correlation as the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic was 2.027.  There was also 
no sign of multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables as the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each variable was less than the critical value of 10.  Out of the three 
explanatory variables, rainfall and land area planted to maize emerged significant at the 
five percent level of probability.  As expected, the results indicate that if both the amount 
of rainfall received and area planted to maize increase, the total harvest of maize in a 
particular production season is also likely to increase.  The negative coefficient of the 
lagged open market price, however, is contrary to expectations for reasons explained 





Table 12: Estimating the maize production function for Swaziland, 1985 – 2006 (after 









B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 






-0.349 0.203 -0.293 -1.717 0.104 0.782 1.279 





0.539 0.226 0.361 2.384 0.029 0.992 1.008 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.705 3 0.235 9.003 0.001 0.614 2.027 
Residual 0.444 17 0.026     
Total 1.149 20      
 
As the model was found to be statistically significant and with all variables, except the 
open market price, showing coefficient signs in concurrence with a priori expectations, the 
production function was then used as a basis to formulate the reduced form model for 
analyzing the impact of food aid on the country’s maize industry. 
5.4.2 Impact of food aid on maize quantity produced and maize producer price 
 
The impact of food aid on maize production in Swaziland was then analysed by solving 
simultaneous equations (quantity function and price function) using a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method.  The same procedure was followed, as in the first attempt, but this 
time with the exclusion of average fertilizer price and average fuel price. 
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Tables 13 and 14 present results obtained from estimating equations (4.7) and (4.11) using 
OLS (with the exclusion of average fertilizer price and average fuel price).  As these were 
intermediate results, there was no need to interpret them at this stage.  A full interpretation 
is given after fitting OLS in stage two.   
 
Table 13: OLS results for estimating maize quantity (Qt) in Swaziland, 1985 – 2006 









B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 






-0.650 0.471 -0.580 -1.382 0.204 0.246 4.059 
Quantity of 
food aid 
lagged by  
two years 











-0.107 0.123 -0.316 -0.871 0.409 0.331 3.025 




1.075 0.448 0.787 2.399 0.043 0.403 2.480 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.557 6 0.093 2.510 0.114 0.653 2.520 
Residual 0.296 8 0.037     
Total 0.854 14      
 
One variable, Qt 2− was excluded when estimating the model using OLS as it showed a 
tolerance level of 0.00, hence providing a source of multicollinearity within the model.  In 
the absence of Qt 2− , the model performed satisfactorily. 
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Table 14: OLS results for estimating open market maize producer price (pt~ ), 









B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 




































by one year 
-0.283 0.355 -0.296 -0.795 0.453 0.565 1.770 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.303 7 0.043 0.831 0.593 0.454 1.779 
Residual 0.365 7 0.052     
Total 0.668 14      
 
The results obtained in stage one, where OLS was used to fit equations (4.7) and (4.11), 
gave the unstandardised coefficients for estimating Qtˆ and pt~̂ as shown in equations (4.12) 
and (4.13).  Estimated quantity (Qtˆ ) was then substituted in the price function (4.14) and 
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estimated price (pt~̂ ) was likewise substituted in the quantity function (4.15) and the two 
equations were then solved simultaneously to analyse the impact of explanatory variables, 
including food aid, on the quantity of maize produced and maize producer price. 
 
Table 15 presents the results obtained when estimating the quantity function (4.14) after 
replacing the price with its estimate.  This is thesame function that analysed the impact of 
food aid, amongst other variables, on quantity of maize produced. 
 
Table 15:  OLS results for analysing impact of food aid on quantity of maize 










B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 




by one year 





0.067 0.088 0.184 0.762 0.466 0.619 1.617 




0.852 0.343 0.622 2.485 0.035 0.572 1.747 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.576 4 0.144 
Residual 0.275 9 
Total 0.851 13 
0.031 
4.714 0.025 0.677 2.258 
 
The F-statistic of the maize quantity function was significant at the five percent level of 
probability with a goodness of fit of 68%.  The function showed no sign of serial 
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correlation as the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic of 2.258 is within the desirable range.  
There was also no sign of multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables as the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable was less than the critical value of 10.  
From a total of four explanatory variables that were included in the model, only two 
emerged significant at the five percent level of probability namely, rainfall and amount of 
land planted to maize.  The quantity of food aid (lagged by one year) was not significant, 
whereas the estimated price was significant at the 10% level of probability. 
 
If food aid had a negative impact on quantity of maize produced, the food aid variable 
would be significant and negative. However, evidence shown in Table 15 showed 
otherwise (as the food aid variable emerged positive and not significant), suggesting that 
there is no significant negative relationship between the quantity of maize produced and 
food aid received by Swaziland. 
 
Table 16 presents results obtained when using OLS on the price function (equation 4.15) 
after replacing the quantity of maize produced with its estimate.  This is the same function 
that analysed the impact of food aid, amongst other variables, on maize producer price. 
 
The F-statistic of the maize producer price function was not significant and the goodness of 
fit was 33%, which is below the acceptable level of R2 (Gujarati 1995:202; Koutsoyiannis, 
1992:122).  The function, though, showed no sign of multicollinearity amongst the 
explanatory variables as the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable was less than 
the critical value of 10.  As the model itself was not significant, none of the explanatory 
variables were found to be significant, including the variable on quantity of food aid.  The 
results, therefore, show that there is no significant relationship between food aid and maize 






Table 16: OLS results for analysing impact of food aid on maize open market 










B Std.error Beta 
t Sig 
Tolerance VIF 






















by one year 
-0.031 0.394 -0.026 -0.079 0.939 0.896 1.116 
ANOVA  Model Summary 




F Sig. R2 DW 
Regression 0.173 4 0.043 0.870 0.527 0.332 1.308 
Residual 0.347 7 0.050     





The overall statistical analysis was constrained by the lack of more data as some degrees of 
freedom were lost in stage two of the 2SLS method.  Nonetheless, the results of the 2SLS 
model revealed that food aid does not have a negative effect on both the quantity of maize 
produced and the maize producer price in Swaziland.  I  both attempts, the maize quantity 
function was significant, showing no serial correlation and no multicollinearity amongst 
explanatory variables.  However, in the first attempt, the estimated food aid coefficient was 
positive and significant at the 10% level of probability, whereas in the second attempt, after 
improving the degrees of freedom, it was positive and not significant.  The price function, 
on the other hand, was not significant in both attempts, hence the explanatory variables 
were also not significant.  The available data set of 1985 – 2006 suggests that food aid does 
not have a negative impact on maize production and maize producer price in Swaziland.  
There is a high possibility that the food aid that comes into the country is received by food 
insecure households located in the areas severely aff cted by drought.  Households located 
in the high rainfall areas and still have the capacity to produce, continue to do so without 


















CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Maize is the staple food of Swaziland and occupies about 80% of the total area under crop 
production in the country.  The objective of the study was to provide empirical evidence on 
whether food aid leads to depressed domestic maize pr c s and reduced maize production.  
Specifically, the study was aimed at providing evidnce on whether food aid leads to lower 
prices in the Swaziland domestic maize market and whether food aid acts as a disincentive 
to local maize producers such that the level of production in Swaziland is reduced in 
subsequent seasons.  This chapter presents a summary of findings, conclusions and policy 
recommendations that could be considered as a means towards reducing the likely effects 
of food aid on domestic agricultural production. 
 
A two-stage least squares method (2SLS) was used to analyse the impact of food aid on 
maize producer price and quantity of maize produced.  The study used secondary national 
data from 1985 to 2006.  Variables used in the analysis included quantity of cereal food 
aid, quantity of commercial maize imports, quantity of locally produced maize, official 
maize producer price, open market maize producer price, fertilizer price, fuel price, rainfall 
and total area planted to maize.  The impact of food aid was measured using the reduced 
form market equilibrium model that consisted of maize quantity and maize producer price 
functions estimated simultaneously using the above variables through the 2SLS method. 
 
The overall statistical analysis was constrained by the lack of more data as some degrees of 
freedom were lost in stage two of the 2SLS method.  However, an attempt was made to 
improve the degrees of freedom through the systematic elimination of variables with 
parameter estimates not significant at least at the 20% level of probability.  The maize 
quantity function was significant, showing no sign of serial correlation and no 
multicollinearity amongst explanatory variables.  The food aid variable was, however 
positive and not significant, meaning that food aidhas no significant impact on maize 
production in the country.  On the other hand, the price function was not significant, hence 





The results of the 2SLS model showed that food aid received by Swaziland does not have a 
negative effect on the quantity of maize produced in subsequent seasons.  The results also 
showed that food aid received by Swaziland does not lead to lower prices in the country’s 
domestic maize market.   
 
The results could be justified by the fact that Swaziland’s domestic food production has 
never matched domestic demand for food even in normal seasons.  In the past, this did not 
have much effect as the country was able to reduce the food gap through commercial food 
imports, which people would access through household income generated through various 
means.  Households located in the Lowveld, dry Middleveld, and part of the Lubombo 
Plateau produced cotton (under rainfed conditions).  This cotton would be sold and returns 
used to buy food (maize) either from commercial outlets or directly from farmers in the 
high rainfall areas.  Cotton is no longer a viable crop in the dry areas, mainly because of the 
current drought and very low returns to the producer.  This has dramatically affected access 
to seasonal and casual employment opportunities that are critically important to the 
livelihoods of the poor in the Lowveld and dry Middleveld.   
 
Households located in the Lowveld, dry Middleveld, and part of the Lubombo Plateau are 
now highly vulnerable to shocks such as drought, and are currently producing neither food 
crops nor cash crops, hence they are food insecure and rely heavily on food aid 
interventions. 
 
The fact that Swaziland still receives commercial imports of maize grain and other food 
types proves that at the national level, the country has not yet developed a food aid 
“dependency syndrome”.  Households that are food secure do not benefit from food aid 
programmes since they are able to access food from co mercial outlets or through own 
food production.  The availability of food aid in the country has not gone beyond the 
threshold likely to disrupt the supply – demand balance.  Therefore, in conclusion, it can be 
stated that food aid received by Swaziland over the s udy years has been correctly targeted 
because had the food aid been distributed to the food secure households, the demand for 
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food from commercial outlets would have been reduce, l ading to an adverse impact on 
maize producer prices, and subsequently local maize production. 
 
6.2 Policy recommendations 
 
Although the analytical results showed that food aid has no statistically significant effect on 
domestic maize production and maize producer price, Swaziland still faces a challenge in 
reducing the food sufficiency gap.  This can be achieved, in part, by increasing local 
production, which will consequently reduce the need for food aid interventions. 
 
The study, therefore, recommends the following national policy interventions that may be 
considered as a means of enhancing local agricultural production: 
 
 There is a need for strengthening collaborative efforts between the public and 
private sectors in increasing investment in water infrastructure for the benefit of the 
rural majority.  The current drought has brought into sharper focus the need to shift 
from rainfed agriculture to irrigated farming.  This calls for an improved annual 
budget allocation for the agricultural sector (in line with regional and international 
declarations to which Swaziland is a signatory).  Allocated funds will not only be 
used for irrigation development but also improving other complementary 
institutional support services such as research and extension, and capacity building 
for local farmers. 
 
 The Swaziland Government needs to consider introducing ommodity support 
programs such as, input subsidies or price support with the aim of boosting local 
agricultural production.  However, this would need a thorough investigation prior to 
implementation in order to identify commodities that could be targeted for support 
and what impact this would have on the farmers, private sector and the macro 
economy. 
 
 The lack of land rights to Swazi Nation Land (where 80% of local farmers produce) 
affects agricultural production as the land cannot be used as collateral by farmers 
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willing to invest through borrowed capital.  The draft Land Policy, which seeks to 
allow farmers on Swazi Nation Land a ninety nine year l ase, has remained in draft 
form for the past seven years.  This policy needs to be reviewed and adopted for 
immediate implementation.     
 
 There is also a need to fully embrace the food security concept as opposed to food 
self-sufficiency.  Food security at household level is mainly constrained by access 
to food, which is closely linked to household income.  Therefore, sustainable pro-
poor development programs are required along with appropriate safety nets.  There 
is a need for a balanced mix of programs that address both the production of food 
and also raise the real incomes of the poor, hence incr asing their access to food. 
 
 In the event that the need for food aid continues to exist, support agencies should be 
encouraged to procure locally produced food commodities.  This could be achieved 
if food dealers could provide food products at regionally competitive prices to 
support agencies.  By so doing, the producer incentiv  in the country would not be 
lost as local producers, particularly those that have not been significantly affected 
by drought, would be guaranteed a reliable market. 
 
 As part of a long-term strategy towards reducing the country’s vulnerability to 
external shocks, Swaziland needs to formulate a comprehensive Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy Framework.  The establishment of a National Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy Framework would contribute towards enhancing capacity for 
timely delivery of food supplies to affected populations during emergencies and 
minimizing disruptions on longer-term agricultural growth and development.  The 
framework should be built on the following closely linked components: 
 
 Swaziland does not have a strategic food reserve despite the fact that the country is 
highly vulnerable to disasters like drought, and storms.  It is recommended that an 
exercise be undertaken to determine the necessity and effectiveness of establishing 




6.3 Recommendations for further research 
 
The overall statistical analysis was constrained by the lack of more data as some degrees of 
freedom were lost in stage two of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method.  The study 
could be improved by increasing the number of years in the analysis in order to address the 
effect of reducing the degrees of freedom.    
 
Another recommendation for further research would be to analyse the same data set using 
the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) to see how the results would compare 
with this study.  The FIML method was used by Tapio-B strom (2001), from whom the 
methodology of this study was based.   
 
As this study was based on national secondary data,there is a need for analysing the effects 
of food aid on food production at household level.  The future study should also analyse the 
likely effects emanating from possible errors of inclusion and errors of exclusion in the 
food aid programme.  Conclusions drawn from the household study would lead to the 
formulation of household – based policy interventios, which would go a long way in 
augmenting existing programmes, such as the newly drafte  Poverty Reduction Strategy 
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Appendix A: Data used for analysing the impact of food aid on maize production in Swaziland, 1985 – 2006 
 
 
Source.  The Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy, Central Statistics Office, Farm Chemicals, 















































1984/85 85000 82553 24000 607 1 303.92 4.48 59.15 1,041.08 1,008.40 
1985/86 85000 80561 21484 3049 0 207.49 6.54 53.46 1,013.57 929.19 
1986/87 91000 63582 6974 7893 1 178.12 5.78 53.18 1,020.36 857.15 
1987/88 89000 80340 27457 10028 1 167.41 5.07 51.00 1,020.40 786.03 
1988/89 123196 84371 32060 2541 1 172.63 5.49 48.11 1,097.14 774.44 
1989/90 84371 97433 16020 4841 0 187.39 5.09 69.17 997.80 657.09 
1990/91 94173 83982 10770 2708 1 162.72 4.42 64.17 877.01 633.73 
1991/92 53927 57330 9917 14975 0 142.86 4.58 57.99 1,205.94 649.35 
1992/93 84519 63563 37072 24599 1 130.18 4.64 53.96 1,098.90 846.32 
1993/94 76195 61585 5745 9766 0 119.44 4.90 50.92 853.11 662.32 
1994/95 76052 59726 10352 6150 1 110.00 4.51 66.53 785.72 610.00 
1995/96 135627 67447 23562 9500 1 165.85 5.13 65.70 700.97 595.82 
1996/97 108207 60905 6767 0 1 170.93 5.55 65.08 652.92 554.97 
1997/98 125204 65149 10106 5000 1 169.49 5.76 61.48 1,029.06 529.54 
1998/99 107340 61051 30760 5000 1 176.80 5.44 59.99 914.28 520.00 
1999/00 112779 76210 24812 0 1 218.61 7.76 67.27 773.04 505.05 
2000/01 82536 64116 34911 0 1 239.95 7.21 66.49 1,148.99 502.68 
2001/02 67639 60133 41307 15531 0 235.29 7.68 85.25 1,200.48 450.18 
2002/03 69273 67682 24324 24200 0 206.94 7.15 69.45 1,358.26 419.46 
2003/04 66862 54470 18641 12900 1 305.41 8.99 73.14 1,312.74 513.51 
2004/05 74540 56265 18378 12100 0 247.16 8.58 62.69 1,253.13 490.20 
2005/06 69210 47409 21000 9710 0 280.74 8.15 75.16 1,189.89 465.46 
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Appendix B: Original data collected for analysing the impact of food aid on maize production in Swaziland, 1985 – 2006 
 
Year Rainfall  
Fuel 
price  Wages 
 
Average fertilizer price (E/50 kg) 
 
 
Maize price (E/ton) 
  (mm) (E/l) (E/hr  
Basal 
(NPK) 






1984/85 825.52 93 1.37 20.35 12.86 18.10 318.57 308.57 
1985/86 662.10 72 2.27 21.00 12.84 18.55 351.71 322.43 
1986/87 896.54 70 2.27 23.90 13.90 20.90 401.00 336.86 
1987/88 963.10 75 2.27 26.45 14.45 22.85 457.14 352.14 
1988/89 794.12 82 2.61 26.45 14.45 22.85 521.14 367.86 
1989/90 632.70 110 2.99 46.00 28.00 40.60 585.71 385.71 
1990/91 832.62 110 2.99 48.90 30.50 43.38 592.86 428.40 
1991/92 552.15 110 3.53 50.50 31.00 44.65 928.57 500.00 
1992/93 796.98 110 3.92 51.00 33.00 45.60 928.57 715.14 
1993/94 673.06 110 4.51 53.50 31.50 46.90 785.72 610.00 
1994/95 779.07 110 4.51 75.35 45.95 66.53 785.72 610.00 
1995/96 902.85 169 5.23 77.50 42.35 66.95 714.29 607.14 
1996/97 992.86 187 6.07 79.45 51.95 71.20 714.29 607.14 
1997/98 1032.51 200 6.80 83.50 47.00 72.55 1,214.29 624.86 
1998/99 850.19 221 6.80 85.70 50.00 74.99 1,142.86 650.00 
1999/00 1588.96 303 10.75 103.20 70.00 93.24 1,071.43 700.00 
2000/01 908.46 358 10.75 110.47 72.94 99.21 1,714.29 750.00 
2001/02 549.61 392 12.79 166.90 84.00 142.03 2,000.00 750.00 
2002/03 565.78 370 12.79 137.75 92.50 124.17 2,428.57 750.00 
2003/04 754.39 565 16.63 150.00 101.00 135.30 2,428.57 950.00 
2004/05 565.94 479 16.63 132.00 97.00 121.50 2,428.57 950.00 
2005/06 695.28 573 16.63 166.00 124.00 153.40 2,428.57 950.00 
Source.  The Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy, Central Statistics Office, Farm Chemicals, 
Swaziland Meteorological Service and National Maize Corporation. 
